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Note
Use of an Informant's Tip
In Establishing Probable Cause
State v. Bernth, 196 Neb. 813,
246 N.W.2d 600 (1976).
In State v. Bernthl the requirements for use of an informant's
tip in establishing probable cause under the fourth amendment
were again considered in Nebraska.2 Under the fourth amend-
ment,3 as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, 4
a warrant is required to search private property,5 and a search war-
rant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause.6
On April 4, 1975, the Associate Judge of the Hall County Court
issued a warrant to search the premises of Rodney L. Bernth. The
affidavit in support of the search warrant stated:
That on the 2nd day of April, 1975, Affiant was advised by an in-
1. 196 Neb. 813, 246 N.W.2d 600 (1976).
2. The Nebraska Supreme Court previously considered the requirements
in State v. Graves, 193 Neb. 797, 229 N.W.2d 538 (1975); State v.
Glouser, 193 Neb. 190, 226 N.W.2d 328 (1975); State v. Holloway, 187
Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d 85 (1971); State v. Waits, 185 Neb. 780, 178 N.W.2d
774 (1970); and State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 176 N.W.2d 21 (1970).
3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Ker v. California; 374 U.S. 23
(1963), the Supreme Court held that the standard of reasonableness
for obtaining a warrant is the same under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments.
5. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
6. "[P]robable cause.. . means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation .... It imports a seizure made under circumstances
which warrant suspicion." Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
339, 348 (1813). Probable cause has been said to have been estab-
lished in an affidavit if a man of ordinary caution or prudence would
be led to believe that an offense had been committed or that the ac-
cused is guilty of an offense. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175-76 (1949).
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formant in oral conversation of the following: That on the 29th
day of March, 1975, said informant had a personal conversation
with suspect and was advised by suspect that suspect had pounds
of grass for sale.
That on the 3rd day of April, 1975, Officer Brad Brush of the
Grand Island Police Department advised Affiant that he had ac-
companied informant on said date in a motor vehicle during which
time informant pointed out the above address as suspect's resi-
dence.7
The premises were searched and a quantity of marijuana was found.
Bernth was convicted of possession of marijuana and possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. The Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed this conviction.8
The defendant argued on appeal that the affidavit failed to state
with sufficient particularity that marijuana was kept at defend-
ant's residence.9 He claimed, therefore, that the affidavit did not
establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant. In affirming
the conviction and upholding the validity of the search, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court stated that affidavits for search warrants
must be interpreted in a common sense and realistic fashion. The
court stated that reasonable grounds for the issuance of a warrant
to search specified premises exist if the apparent facts set out in
the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man
would be led to believe the property sought was on the premises
described.10
The court concluded that the dealer status of the defendant was
obvious in that he had stated to the informant that he had "pounds"
of marijuana to sell. The court's reasoning proceeded on the follow-
ing grounds. Because this quantity of marijuana could not be car-
ried on the person, and being subject to theft, could not be left
unprotected in an automobile, the marijuana could be kept in only
one logical place--the defendant's residence. This conclusion could
be reached by applying the issuing magistrate's "wide experience"
in issuing search warrants, which "over the years has demonstrated
that [marijuana is] usually kept in a dealer's place of residence
7. Brief of Appellant at 6.
8. 196 Neb. at 819, 246 N.W.2d at 603. A second issue before the court
was whether simple possession of a controlled substance is a lesser
included offense within a charge of possession with intent to distribute.
The court concluded that simple possession is a lesser included offense,
and reversed the conviction and sentence on the charge of simple pos-
session.
9. Id. at 815, 246 N.W.2d at 601. Defendant conceded that the informant
was reliable.
10. Id
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and under constant surveillance or supervision."'" The court but-
tressed its reasoning by citing several federal appeals cases,'12 all
of which approved issuance of a search warrant based upon an in-
formant's tip; the tips in question, however, did not definitely state
that the objects sought were in defendants' residences.13
In order to understand the significance of the Bernth decision,
it is necessary to examine it against the background of the guide-
lines laid down by the United States Supreme Court on issuance
of a search warrant based on an informant's tip. The Court has
formulated these guidelines in six cases: Jones v. United States,'
4
Rugendorf v. United States,"5 Aguilar v. Texas,'6 United States v.
Ventresca,17 Spinelli v. United States,'8 and United States v.
Harris.'9
In Jones v. United States,20 the defendant's apartment was
searched pursuant to a warrant based on an informant's tip.2 ' De-
fendant argued on appeal that the affidavit did not establish prob-
11. Id. at 817, 246 N.W.2d at 602.
12. Agnellino v. State, 493 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Mulli-
gan, 488 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1973); Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860
(5th Cir. 1973).
13. The applicability of these cases to the court's decision is at best de-
batable. Although none of the affidavits state that the objects sought
were in the premises to be searched, there was sufficient information
alleged in the affidavits to link the objects sought with the premises.
In Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860 ('5th Cir. 1973), for example,
the informant saw the suspects carrying the sought-after automatic
pistols and reported that they had told him they were returning to
their apartment. In United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.
1973), sufficient details were alleged about the suspect's criminal
habits to establish that the evidence specified in the warrant was lo-
cated in suspect's apartment, and to eliminate any other possible hid-
ing place. Similarly, sufficient detail was alleged in Agnellino v.
State, 493 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1974), to eliminate all other possible loca-
tions of the sought-after contraband other than in the suspect's res-
taurant.
14. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
15. 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
16. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
17. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
18. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
19. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
20. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
21. The affidavit contained information from an unidentified source that
the suspect was "involved in the illicit narcotic traffic" and "kept a
ready supply of heroin on hand" in the apartment. The informant
also stated that he had purchased narcotics from the suspects at the
apartment. The affidavit went on to state that the informant had pre-
viously given information which was correct, and that the information
had been corroborated by other sources. Id. at 268-69.
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able cause because it did not set forth the affiant's personal obser-
vations regarding the presence of narcotics in the apartment, but
rested entirely on hearsay. Relying on Nathanson v. United
States,22 which held that an affidavit does not establish probable
cause if it merely states the affiant's belief that there is cause to
search, without stating facts upon which that belief is based, de-
fendant argued, a fortiori, this is true of an affidavit which states
only the belief of one not the affiant.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Because an officer
may act without a warrant on an informant's tip, so long as the
informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters
within the officer's knowledge, 2 the officer may also act with a
warrant based on an informant's tip, "so long as a substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay is present." 24  Thus an affidavit for a
search warrant may be based on hearsay so long as a substantial
basis for believing the hearsay is evident in the affidavit.2 5
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the substantial basis test in
Rugendorf v. United States.26 In this case the informant provided
a detailed description of allegedly stolen furs he had seen in peti-
tioner's basement. This information was corroborated by independ-
ent police investigation. The Court, while emphasizing the amount
of detail present in the affidavit,27 held that the affidavit presented
a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
In the seminal case of Aguilar v. Texas,28 decided the same year
as Rugendorf, the Supreme Court formulated more rigid guidelines
for establishing probable cause than the nebulous substantial basis
test. The warrant in Aguilar was obtained upon the basis of an
affidavit which stated: "Affiants have received reliable informa-
22. 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
23. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
24. 362 U.S. at 269.
25. "Substantial basis" was established because the affidavit specified that
the informant was reliable, having given correct information in the
past; further, the affidavit alleged that the information given by the
informant had been corroborated by other sources, and alleged that
defendant was a known user of narcotics. Such corroboration "re-
duced the chances [that the information was] a reckless or prevari-
cating tale," and the charge that suspect was a known user of nar-
cotics "made the charge against him much less subject to scepticism
than would be such a charge against one without such a history." Id.
at 271.
26. 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
27. The affidavit contained the informant's detailed description of the
stolen furs along with another informant's statement labeling defend-
ant a "fence."
28. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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tion from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana,
barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are be-
ing kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale
and use contrary to the provisions of the law. " 29 The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction for possession of narcotics, and con-
cluded that the warrant should not have been issued because the
affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of probable
cause. The Court acknowledged the holdings of Jones and Rugen-
dorf that an affidavit may be based on hearsay information, but
held that "the magistrate must be informed of [1] some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that
the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and [2] some of
the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that
the informant .. .was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'"30
The affidavit contained no information from which the Court could
determine why the officer concluded that the informant was re-
liable, and -contained none of the underlying circumstances from
which the informant concluded that the narcotics were in the
premises to be searched. Such information could have been sup-
plied had the affidavit detailed that the informant had given reli-
able information in the past, and that he had, for example, either
seen or purchased narcotics on the premises to be searched.
These stronger guidelines for establishing probable cause had
their genesis in the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson in Johnson
v. United States:8'
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the sup-
port of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evi-
dence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.32
If warrants were to be issued on the basis of the information pro-
vided in Aguilar, then the inferences from the facts which lead to
the complaint would not be drawn "by a neutral and detached
magistrate," as the Constitution requires, but instead would be
drawn by a police officer "engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime." The magistrate would in effect be
accepting the police officer's judgment rather than his own, or
29. Id. at 109 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 114 (footnote omitted).
31. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
32. Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
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worse yet, would be accepting the judgment of an unidentified in-
former.
33
The Supreme Court apparently combined the "underlying cir-
cumstances" test of Aguilar with the "sufficient detail" analysis of
Rugendorf in United States v. Ventresca,3 4 where the Court held
that, "where ... circumstances are detailed, where reason for
crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magis-
trate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate
the warrant."3 5  Ventresca involved a search warrant based on
an affidavit couched in deliberately ambiguous terms as to who
the observers of the alleged criminal activity were. Since the affi-
davit had not specified who had made the observations, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated the search warrant.
The court of appeals could not determine whether the information
provided by these others had or had not been based upon hearsay
received from informants whose credibility could not be substan-
tiated.
3 6
In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court was apparently influenced by the detailed descriptions con-
tained in the affidavit.37 These details, if read in a commonsense
manner, would be sufficient to assure a magistrate that the source
was credible and the information reliable, and supply a sufficient
basis for establishing probable cause. The result of Ventresca is
that the identity of the informer need not be stated, nor the under-
lying circumstances attesting to his reliability, so long as sufficient
detail is provided to assure the magistrate that the source of in-
formation is reliable. 38 Further, in marginal or doubtful cases, the
resolution is to be largely determined by the preference to be ac-
corded to warrants.
3 9
Although Ventresca seemed to relax the requirements for estab-
lishing probable cause, the more rigid standards of the Aguilar two-
33. 378 U.S. at 114-15.
34. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
35. Id. at 109.
36. United States v. Ventresca, 324 F.2d 864, 869 (1st Cir. 1963), rev'd,
380 U.S. 102 (1965).
37. The affidavit described seven different occasions when a specified au-
tomobile made deliveries to the suspect's house; the contents of the
automobile were described in detail on each occasion; the investigators
reported the smell of fermenting mash emanating from the suspect's
residence, and sounds similar to a motor or a pump were heard coming
from the house. 380 U.S. at 104.
38. Levinson, Employment of Informant's Statements in Establishing
Probable Cause for Issuance of a Search Warrant, 4 J. MAR. J. PRAc.
& Paoc. 38, 42 (1970).
39. 380 U.S. at 106; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960).
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pronged test were reaffirmed in Spinelii v. United States.4 0 Spin-
elli dealt with an informant's tip which was partially corroborated
by independent sources. The defendant was convicted of conduct-
ing illegal interstate gambling activities despite his claim that the
search warrant used to uncover evidence used to convict him was
not founded upon probable cause. The affidavit in substance al-
leged: (1) that F.B.I. agents had followed defendant for five days,
on four of which he was seen crossing from Illinois to St. Louis,
Missouri, (2) that he had been seen to park his car at a St. Louis
apartment house, and on one day was seen to enter a particular
apartment in that house, (3) that the apartment contained two
phones with specified numbers, (4) that defendant was known to
affiant as a gambler and associate of gamblers, and (5) that the
F.B.I. had "been informed by a confidential and reliable informant"
that petitioner was "operating a handbook and accepting wagers
and disseminating wagering information by means of the tele-
phones" which had been assigned the specified numbers.
4
1
The Supreme Court deemed the informant's tip the fundamental
item in the affidavit, for without it probable cause could not be
established. 42  Rejecting the "totality of the *circumstances" test
used by the court of appeals to validate the warrant,48 the Court
employed a more precise analysis to determine the weight to be
given to the tip.
The Supreme Court applied the Aguilar test to both the tip and
the corroborative allegations. Under this analysis, neither the tip
40. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Following Ventresca, many federal courts began
applying a "totality of the circumstances" test. Under this standard
of review, probable cause may arise from the "totality" of the facts
disclosed in an affidavit, even though each allegation in itself would
be insufficient to establish probable cause. See Comment, For In-
formant's Tips to Establish Probable Cause Such Tips Must Meet
Aguilar Standards Even When Partially Corroborated by Independent
Investigation, 21 S.C.L. Rsv. 246, 249 (1969). See also Spinelli
v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 410
(1969); United States v. Pinkerman, 374 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1967); Her-
nandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965); Calo v. United
States, 338 F.2d 793 (1st Cir. 1964); United States v. Crews, 326 F.2d
755 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Delia, 283 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
41. 393 U.S. at 413-14.
42. The first two items reflect only innocent-seeming activity and
data. Spinelli's travels to and from the apartment building
and his entry into a particular apartment on one occasion
could hardly be taken as bespeaking gambling activity; and
there is surely nothing unusual about an apartment containing
two separate telephones. Many a householder indulges him-
self in this petty luxury.
Id. at 414.
43. See note 40 supra.
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nor the corroborative allegations were sufficient to establish prob-
able cause-the tip did not provide any of the underlying circum-
stances upon which the magistrate could gauge the informant's re-
liability, nor did it provide any of the underlying circumstances
from which the informant concluded that Spinelli was running a
bookmaking operation. 4 4 Moreover, the independent investigative
efforts of the F.B.I. did nothing to cure the defects in the inform-
ant's tip;
[alt most, these allegations indicated that Spinelli could have used
the telephones specified by the informant for some purpose. This
cannot by itself be said to support both the inference that the in-
former was generally trustworthy and that he had made his charge
against Spinelli on the basis of information obtained in a reliable
way.4 5
The Supreme Court further pointed out that, even absent a
showing of the underlying circumstances, provision of sufficient de-
tail of the accused's criminal activity would validate the warrant.
This would let the magistrate know "that he is relying on something
more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld
or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputa-
tion." 46 There was, however, insufficient detail alleged to support
a finding of probable cause. The detail alleged was that Spinelli
was using two specified telephones and that these phones were be-
ing used in gambling operations. This detail "could easily have
been obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood
bar. 4 7 Spinelli, then, stands for the proposition that an informant's
tip must either pass the Aguilar underlying circumstances test, or
must be supported by sufficient detail of the accused's criminal ac-
tivities in order to support a finding of probable cause.
Finally, in United States v. Harris,48 the Supreme Court ex-
panded on the second prong of the Aguilar test. Rather than re-
quiring a statement of some of the underlying circumstances from
which the magistrate can conclude that the informant is reliable,
the Court held that there is a substantial basis for crediting the
informant's reliability where the informant gives the information
against his own penal interest.49 The Court simultaneously resur-
rected the Jones substantial basis test, holding that the affidavit
established probable cause where the affiant corroborated the in-
44. 393 U.S. at 416.
45. Id. at 417.
46. Id at 416.
47. Id. at 417.
48. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
49. Id. at 583.
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formant's tip by swearing knowledge and familiarity with defend-
ant's illicit activity.
In summary, the Supreme Court cases delineate three ways in
which an affidavit based on an informant's tip may be validated:
(1) by providing a substantial basis upon which the magistrate may
credit the informant's tip, (2) by providing the underlying circum-
stances from which the magistrate can conclude that the informant
was credible and his information accurate, and (3) by providing
sufficient detail of the accused's alleged criminal activities. In view
of Rugendorf, Ventresca, and Spinelli, it appears that the Court's
preference for the sufficient detail test is stronger than for either
the underlying circumstances test or the substantial basis test. As
a practical matter, however, satisfaction of any of these tests will
probably result in a finding of probable cause, thereby validating
the search warrant.50
In light of these tests, it is difficult to understand how the search
'warrant in Bernth could have been validated. It is clear that there
is not sufficient detail in the affidavit of the type contemplated in
Ventresca to establish that the sought-after contraband was on the
premises described. Nor does the affidavit provide a substantial
basis or detail the underlying circumstances from which it could
be established that the contraband was located in the premises to
be searched. The affidavit does not seem to fulfill the require-
ments of any of the tests previously set forth.
The principal defect of the affidavit in question is that the state-
ments of the informant do not sufficiently connect the contraband
sought with the residence to be searched. The essence of the Ag-
uilar test for probable cause is that the magistrate must be informed
of "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were."5 1
Similarly, probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
to search specified premises exists "if the apparent facts set out
in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent
man would be led to believe the property sought was on the prem-
ises described. '52 Clearly, there must be shown that some connec-
tion exists between the property sought and the premises to be
searched.
The Supreme Court cases indicate several ways in which this
connection may be established. A report that the informant had
either seen defendant at work or had placed a bet with him, coupled
50. Levinson, supra note 38, at 46.
51. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added).
5. State v. Bernth, 196 Neb. 813, 815, 246 N.W.2d 600, 601 (1976) (empha-
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with police surveillance, would have sufficed to link the criminal
activity with the premises to be searched in Spinelli.53  Similarly,
seeing or purchasing contraband on the premises in question was
enough to establish probable cause in Jones,54 Rugendorf,5 5 and
Harris.56 Finally, a detailed report of police surveillance of the
premises may be sufficient to establish that the objects sought are
in the premises to be searched.5 7
In the Bernt case, however, not only did the affidavit not de-
tail any of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded that the marijuana was where he said it was, but the
affidavit did not even have the informant concluding that the mari-
juana was anywhere. The affidavit merely stated that "[a]ffiant
has reason to and does believe that there is situated within the
above-described premises, a controlled substance, to-wit: mari-
juana.15 8 The affiant's statement is clearly a "mere affirmation of
suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate supporting
facts," 59 and as such is but a "bald and unilluminating assertion
of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in appraising the magis-
trate's decision."'60 When a magistrate issues a search warrant upon
a mere affirmation of suspicion or belief, not supported by sufficient
facts to sustain a finding of probable cause, he abdicates his con-
stitutional function as the "neutral and detached"'61 magistrate de-
termining probable cause, and, by adopting the affiant's conclusions,
acts as a "rubber stamp" for the police.
6 2
This analysis does not assert that the Court guidelines supra are
exhaustive. There are innumerable fact situations which would
support a finding of probable cause.68  Generally, however, the
statement "I have pounds of grass for sale" will be insufficient to
establish probable cause to search. In order to establish probable
cause, such a statement requires either additional allegations by the
informant linking the marijuana with the premises to be searched,
or corroboration through independent police investigation.
sis added).
53. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 416.
54. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 271.
55. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. at 53.
56. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. at 579.
57. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1964) (dicta).
58. Brief of Appellant at 14.
59. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933).
60. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1969).
61. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
62. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
63. United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1960).
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The adequacy of the informant's tip to establish probable cause
is found by allowing the magistrate to use his "wide experience"
which over the years has shown that a dealer keeps his supply in
only one place-his home.64 This application of "wide experience"
is based on the magistrate's common sense. However, there is a
serious question as to the validity of going beyond the face of the
affidavit and interpreting it in the light of the magistrate's pre-
sumptions. The United States Supreme Court has held that in pass-
ing on the validity of a warrant, the Court may consider only in-
formation brought to the attention of the magistrate. 65 In Giorde-
nello v. United States,6  the affidavit was held insufficient to estab-
lish probable cause, because it contained no affirmative allegation
that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the allegations
contained therein. This defect, the Court held, could not be cured
"by the [magistrate's] reliance upon a presumption that the com-
plaint was made on the personal knowledge of the complaining of-
ficer." 67  Similarly then, it would seem that the defect in the
Bernth affidavit could not be cured by reliance on the presumption
that a dealer keeps his supplies only in his home. Moreover, this
may not be a valid presumption in the first place. Two Nebraska
cases have shown that one need only be in possession of a very
small amount of a controlled substance to be deemed guilty of pos-
session with intent to distribute. 68 A small amount of a controlled
substance need not be kept at the dealer's residence, but could be
hidden literally anywhere-in an automobile, the residence of a
friend, or on the person. It is thus not a valid presumption that
a dealer always keeps his supply at home.
Previous Nebraska cases dealing with search warrants issued
upon an informant's tip have not relied upon a presumption that
the sought-after contraband was in a given place, but have always
established a connection between the premises to be searched and
64. State v. Bernth, 196 Neb. at 817, 246 N.W.2d at 602.
65. This is called the "four corners" doctrine. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 109 n.1. (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,
486 (1958); United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden of Attica State
Prison, 381 F.2d 209, 218 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Hinton, 219
F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955).
66. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
67. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
68. State v. Rathburn, 195 Neb. 485, 239 N.W.2d 253 (1976) (400 tablets
of LSD sufficient to sustain conviction for possession with intent to
distribute); State v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 621, 211 N.W.2d 125 (1973)
(possession of under a pound of marijuana by two persons sufficient
to sustain conviction of possession of controlled substance with intent
to distribute).
894 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 4 (1977)
the objects to be seized. In State v. Graves,69 for example, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court upheld the issuance of a search warrant
based on an informant's tip, even though the tip had not stated
that the heroin sought was on the premises to be searched. How-
ever, a sufficient connection was established between the two when
the informant stated that the contraband was expected to be de-
livered at the premises, and by the fact that the apartment had
previously been used for heroin cutting purposes.
70
Similarly, in State v. Glouser7' the connection between the
searched-for heroin and the place to be searched-defendant's per-
son and luggage-was established by the fact that defendant and
her husband both had a past history of association with drugs, and
that defendant was making frequent trips of short duration to an
area of known drug source, carrying a very small amount of lug-
gage. This was sufficient to reasonably indicate a drug operation
to a magistrate.
72
The result in Bernth is even more puzzling when compared to
State v.. Holloway.73 There the affidavit in support of the search
warrant was held to be insufficient to establish probable cause, be-
cause it merely recited that the only reason for the affiant's belief
that the sought-after guns were kept on the described premises was
"information received from an informant whose information has
been reliable in the past. ' 74 The court held that the affidavit re-
cited a bare conclusion, and detailed none of the underlying circum-
stances from which either the affiant or the informant concluded
that the guns were where they said they were.
CONCLUSION
By going beyond the previous judicial holdings in emasculating
the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures,7 5 the Nebraska Supreme Court threatens to warp the
entire legal system, which "will uproot principles even at the core
of American law. '7 6 In a broad sense, the holding means that on
69. 193 Neb. 797, 229 N.W.2d 538 (1975).
70. Id. at 803, 229 N.W.2d at 542-43.
71. 193 Neb. 190, 226 N.W.2d 328 (1975).
72. Id. at 195-96, 226 N.W.2d at 331.
73. 187 Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d 85 (1971).
74. Id. at 2-3, 187 N.W.2d at 88.
75. State v. Berntl 196 Neb. at 819, 246 N.W.2d at 603 (McCown, J., dis-
senting).
76. Snowden, A Holistic Jurisprudential View of the Drug Victim, 54 NEB.
L. REv. 350, 352 (1975).
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the basis of one simple statement, even if said in jest, the court
could issue a warrant to search not only an individual's home, but
his automobile, office, business, or anywhere else under his con-
trol.
7
James Holman '78
77. 196 Neb. at 819, 246 N.W.2d at 603 (McCown, J., dissenting).
The decision of this court effectively destroys the protec-
tion afforded to every citizen under the specific terms of the
Constitution of the United States .... It also sets out a new
and unique basis for determining what constitutes probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant. If the home of
any citizen is open to police search whenever a reliable in-
former reports that the citizen made a statement implicating
himself in the possession of illegal substances or things, the
dread spectre of a police state is all too close and real.
Id. at 821, 246 N.W.2d at 604.
